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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This study is driven by some fundamental issues evolving in Pakistan’s 
educational set-up. In the past few decades, the country has been experiencing what 
can only be termed a dramatic revolution in education provision. There has been an 
explosion of private schooling mostly at the primary but at higher levels as well and, 
somewhat surprisingly, private schooling cannot be relegated the status of an urban 
èlite phenomenon alone [Andrabi, et al. (2002)].  This has taken the form of many 
poor households and those in rural areas opting to send their children to fee-paying 
private schools rather than the non-fee charging government schools. This 
transformation of the education sector has generated many concerns among which 
the ‘equity’ issue has been raised to the fore. The unprecedented growth of cheap 
private schooling has also raised questions regarding the role of these institutions in 
the delivery of education, the question of parental ‘choice’1 as well as the future of 
government educational policy. 
In this scenario, it has become critical to understand how pupils educated in 
the two broadly divided school types—government and private—fare in terms of 
measures of achievement and skills in literacy and numeracy. This is primarily 
because achievement scores are one of the main ways in which policy-makers can 
analyse the translation of educational inputs into outputs, one of the ways of 
measuring which is achievement scores. Additionally, the question of which inputs 
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and factors in the two school-management types are beneficial and detrimental to 
pupil’s achievement is of crucial significance. This is the primary aim of our 
preliminary research—to unpack, for policy purposes and intellectual debate, the 
main determinants of pupil achievement in government and private school sub-
samples in one district of the Punjab.2  
In this study, we analyse the determinants of pupil achievement of middle 
school students using purpose built data collected on 8th grade pupils in private and 
government schools in urban and rural Lahore (2002-2003). At a broader level we 
are interested in determining whether home background factors are more important 
than teacher and school variables in explaining pupil achievement. In particular, we 
focus on the importance of teacher-related variables (such as pay) and student 
absenteeism in determining achievement. The former because it has traditionally 
been a crucial indicator of the quality of teachers and, hence, the quality of schooling 
available to a child, and the latter because it reflects not just the socio-economic 
status of the family but is also an indicator of the attitude and motivation of a pupil to 
learn in school.  
At the outset, one must emphasise that the terms ‘government’ and ‘private’ 
schools in Pakistan actually encompass a very broad array of school-types. Among 
both school-types, there are schools which generate pupils who are taught overseas 
curricula, sit exams from external universities and have the ability to compete at 
international levels. Among both types of schools, however, the majority rear 
children with barely the ability to read and write, who sit in hardly-lit class rooms, 
with untrained, underpaid teachers teaching with bare necessities and skills. 
However, as in official circles and in economic debates, schools in Pakistan are 
broadly classified as government or private, in this paper we limit ourself to this 
broad categorisation of schooling into two types—government and private.  
A very large literature has been devoted to understanding the impact of school 
quality on educational outcomes in developed and developing countries. The 
outcomes of these studies have yielded mixed results. Hanushek [(1986), p. 1162] in 
his review of 147 educational production function studies on developed countries 
concludes that ‘There appears to be no strong or systematic relationship between 
school expenditures and student performance’. Fuller [(1986), p. 1] reviews 72 
developing countries studies and came to a more positive conclusion, finding 
‘…those material inputs directly linked to the instructional process consistently 
influence pupil achievement’.  More recent studies of the effect of inputs on pupil 
achievement include those by Case and Deaton (1999); Angrist and Lavy (1999), 
Krueger (1999); Hoxby (2000); Hanushek, et al. (1999); Glewwe and Jacoby (1994); 
Kingdon (1996); Kingdon and Teal (2002) among others.  
 
2The choice of the Punjab for the field survey is based on two main grounds: (1) The author is 
based in Punjab and logistic support for the D.Phil. fieldwork was most conveniently available in this 
region and (2) Recent literature in private schooling in Pakistan has noticed that much of the expansion in 
private schooling has been particularly prominent in the province of Punjab. 
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A number of studies in the past few years have attempted to understand how 
school quality affects schooling decisions in Pakistan.  A study in Lahore district has 
found that there is a sufficient demand for education among even the poorest 
households [Alderman, et al. (1996)] while another suggests that between 30-40 
percent of the gender gap in cognitive skill achievement between boys and girls in 
rural Pakistan is accounted for by differences in school availability [Alderman, et al. 
(1996a)]. Another study [Lloyd, et al. (2002)] finds that parental choice of school 
type and enrolment decision in rural Pakistan, particularly of girls, is highly 
dependent on school availability and elements of school-quality. Previous studies in 
rural Pakistan also find that school retention and drop out rates of pupils in Pakistan 
depend on school quality factors [Behrman, et al. (1997)]. 
The present study highlights the importance of student absenteeism in 
determining cognitive skills achievement of pupils in grade 8. High levels of student 
absenteeism can have a negative impact on a pupils’ ability to learn. Students who do 
not attend school regularly are less likely to learn and more likely to score poorly on 
tests of achievement. In Pakistan, student absenteeism has been a chronic problem. 
Figures 1 to 4 in Appendix I depict the days absent in the month of September, 20023 
of pupils in our sample. It is apparent that 60 percent of our student sample had been 
absent at least 1 day in September. The most oft-cited reason for this absenteeism 
was illness (63.3 percent absent claiming illness). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate student 
absenteeism by school-type and by gender. It is clear from the graphs that pupils 
from government schools are absent more often than their counterparts in private 
schools and that girls are absent more often than boys. 
It is critical to care about student attendance because a child’s later successes 
depend upon a concrete educational background which depends partly on regular 
school attendance. A handful of authors have included a measure of school 
attendance as a right-hand-side variable in education production functions. For 
example, Tan, Lane and Coustere (1997) find that reduced attendance is associated 
with a significantly negative effect on mathematics scores in the Philippines. Fuller, 
et al. (1999) also uses this variable to measure achievement in Brazil but the point 
estimates are insignificant. Both these authors, however, do not take into account the 
endogeneity of student attendance. To our knowledge there are two studies which 
take into account the endogeneity of student attendance and estimate its effects on 
test scores while a third is concerned more with the factors determining school 
attendance. Ehrenberg, et al. (1991) and Orazem, et al. (1995) analyse the causal 
relationship between student and teacher absenteeism and the resulting impact on test 
scores in USA and Pakistan, respectively. The former find that higher student 
absenteeism is associated with poorer performance by students on tests scores in 
 
3We asked the students specifically about how many days, if any, they had been absent in the 
month of September. Since our survey work started on 30 September 2002, it was deemed appropriate to 
ask all students about absenteeism in September for ease of pupil recall and to reduce measurement error.   
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USA (pp. 99) and the latter find that student attendance has a consistently negative 
but imprecisely measured effect on pupil achievement (pp. 13) in Pakistan. The final 
study by Bedi and Marshall (2000) analyses the determinants of student absenteeism 
in Honduras, treating pupil achievement as endogenous. The authors find that the 
expected human capital benefit, or pupil achievement, is an important determinant of 
school attendance (pp. 22).   
Our study is one of the only attempts to address the impact of student 
absenteeism on achievement for Punjab, Pakistan. The only other published study we 
are aware of is by Orazem, et al. (1995) but this study has a number of 
methodological drawbacks. Orazem, et al.’s study also focuses on a different 
province and at a different level of education. Another unique feature of our study is 
that we have individual level data available to us. Ehrenberg, et al. (1991) 
themselves note that perhaps one of the problems in their study is that by aggregating 
across school districts, their variables may face substantial measurement error. We 
do not face this problem due to the nature of our data set.  
It is worth emphasising that this paper presents preliminary evidence rather 
than definitive conclusions. Although the results provide food for thought, there is 
room for considerable improvement. This pertains specifically to dealing with 
endogeniety of inputs to schooling as well as sample selectivity problems. This paper 
is structured into 7 sections. Section 2 analyses the economic model and the 
conceptual and econometric limitations of educational production function analysis. 
Section 3 describes the data utilised in this study. Section 4 reviews the method 
adopted. Section 5 estimates the main relationships in the educational achievement 
function and Section 6 provides a comparison of the results with some results 
obtained by other studies while Section 7 concludes.   
 
2.  ECONOMIC MODELLING OF ACHIEVEMENT 
AND ESTIMATION ISSUES 
The proposal that educational inputs should be important determinants of 
educational outcomes is one that appeals to common sense. A priori, existing 
empirical literature and logic seem to suggest a number of determinants of pupil 
achievement. One way of quantifying the determinants of students’ achievement is to 
take the production function (also known as the ‘input-output’) approach. The model 
underlying this approach is straightforward and postulates that the output of the 
educational process is related to a series of measurable inputs:4 
Aij =  f ( Iij, Fij, Pj, Sj, Tj, єij) … … … … … (1) 
 
4The education production model portrays the relationship as cumulative, i.e. past inputs are 
important in determining current achievement. Given this, an alternative specification would be to 
estimate the ‘value-added’ production function which necessitates achievement data at two points in time 
so as to capture the change in achievement over time. These data requirements, however, are hardly ever 
met in developing countries.  
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Where 
 Aij    = Educational achievement (measured by test scores) of student i in 
school j. 
 Iij    = Individual characteristics of pupil i such as age, gender, ability etc. 
 Fij  = Family background/parental characteristics of pupil i such as parental 
education, family income/wealth, household size and structure etc. 
 Pj  = Peer group variables of student i in school j such as average ability of 
students in the same class/section, proportion of females in 
class/section, average mother’s education etc. 
 Sj = Characteristics of school j, such as school type, location (urban/rural), 
level of the school such as middle, high etc., class size, resources 
available in the school etc. 
 Tj = Teacher characteristics in school j such as gender, teacher pay, 
education, training, experience, tenure etc.  
 єi  = unexplained variation in Aij, assumed to be distributed normally with 
mean zero and constant variance.  
Unfortunately, standard textbook analyses of production function 
specifications provide very little insight into the appropriate specifications of the 
educational production function, considering only stylised relationships between 
capital, labour and output. The education production function is unknown and has to 
be estimated using imperfect, and often, incomplete data. Also, unlike the standard 
production function of the firm, where various variables are amenable to variation, at 
least in the long run, as already mentioned, there are various inputs into the 
education production function (such as pupil genetic endowment and socio-economic 
status) that cannot be varied by policy-makers.  
Despite these conceptual problems, the ‘technological’ relationship in (1) has 
become quite popular and controversial at the same time. Its popularity stems from 
its simplicity in explaining a crucial relationship. However, controversy surrounds 
the estimation of this deceptively simple relationship and it is to the limitations of 
this approach that we turn before estimating an education production function for 
Pakistan. 
 
2.1.  Conceptual Difficulties and Limitations to Empirical Analysis 
 
2.1.1.  Endogeneity 
One of the potentially most serious problems associated with the above 
function is the fact that a number of inputs entered as explanatory variables are 
endogenous. Inability to address endogeneity and naively estimating Equation (1) 
using OLS can give biased coefficients of all included variables.  At best, in the 
presence of endogeneity, one can only give a correlational interpretation to the 
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results, rather than a causal one. Since this is one of the most frequent problems 
faced, it is worth analysing in more detail and understanding not only why it might 
be a problem but also how solutions can be found for it. 
One of the most likely reasons to encounter endogeneity in education 
production is the fact that a number of the inputs are choice variables. Not only 
parents, but also children, teachers and their schools have a considerable amount of 
discretion in choosing the inputs that go into learning, and hence, pupil achievement. 
When some of these are unobservable by the researcher, such as parental or child 
motivation and teacher effort, they are captured in the error term and are correlated 
with an included regressor, and we cannot be sure that the estimated parameter of 
this regressor is capturing just the effect of this regressor on the dependent variable. 
The observed association between the outcome and explanatory variable of interest, 
therefore, is likely to be misleading because it partly reflects the effect of omitted 
factors (captured in εi) that are related to the regressor and the dependent variable. If 
one could estimate these ‘unobservables’, this ‘omitted variable bias’ could be 
considerably reduced. In practice, however, there are many variables which cannot 
be successfully measured as independent regressors in the equation of interest. This 
problem of endogenous variables is likely to lead to biased parameter estimates in 
naive OLS regression analysis. Two of the variables we are particularly interested 
in—teacher pay and student absenteeism—are potentially endogenous. Let us 
analyse each in turn.  
It has been argued that higher teacher pay may increase pupil achievement if 
teacher pay is decidedly linked to teacher quality. Evidence from developed 
countries provides limited evidence of a systematic relationship. A study by 
Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (1999), found only a modest impact of teacher salary on 
student performance using data on the USA. If, however, a causal relationship exists, 
there are various possibilities that can explain it. Firstly, higher teacher pay may be 
used to attract a better pool of applicants from the job market. By offering wages 
higher than the market alternatives, the school may be able to improve the average 
quality of the pool of applicants applying for jobs in that school, which may arguably 
be translated into higher pupil achievement. Secondly, higher pay may be used by 
schools to prevent their employees from leaving—retention objectives. This is 
because the existence of turnover and training costs makes it very costly for a school 
to lose an employee. Thirdly, more within the realms of the efficiency wage 
literature, higher teacher pay may be used to motivate teachers to work harder. In 
reality, however, higher teacher pay is often associated with schools serving students 
from a better socio-economic status. In addition, if schools pay teachers 
‘performance-related pay’ as the motivating rationale of efficiency wages would 
suggest, one may find a reverse causality between teacher pay and pupil achievement 
(higher pupil achievement may be rewarded by higher teacher pay). It is difficult to 
disentangle the true relationship between teacher pay and pupil achievement due to 
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this possible endogeneity, stemming from the economists inability to ‘observe’ key 
variables. 
Student Absenteeism is, surprisingly, a variable that has not been given much 
attention in studies of student achievement. What is even more surprising is how it 
has not figured much in the debate on pupil achievement in Pakistan, where student 
absenteeism from school remains a persistent and ever-present problem. In our data 
set, Head Teachers’ response to the ‘Attendance rate of students at the Primary, 
Middle and Higher levels’ revealed that the attendance is an average5 of 74 percent at 
the Primary, and 78 percent at Secondary and Higher levels—for every 100 pupils in 
Middle level, for example, 22 pupils are absent daily on average.   
Student absence may be due to illness, which draws attention to the nutritional 
and health aspects of child development. Alternatively, it may be related to socio-
economic status—self-employed parents may need sons to help with work, in 
particular, in rural areas farmers may need seasonal help in harvesting seasons.6  In 
addition, girls may be absent from school because the burden of household chores 
(such as looking after babies or the elderly, or other domestic work) may fall on 
them. Another potential factor leading to absenteeism could very well be pupil 
ability. Intuitively, one expects a negative relationship—a less able child may also be 
less motivated to attend school, which in turn, could decrease his achievement. 
Therefore, much as in the case of teacher pay, if student absenteeism is tied to 
student achievement, a reverse causality emerges in estimating achievement using 
student absenteeism as a regressor. In a similar vein, we expect teacher absenteeism 
to be endogenous—if lower pupil achievement leads to lower teacher morale which 
generates higher teacher absenteeism, we expect teacher attendance to be 
endogenous. Moreover, if an unobservable captured in the error term, such as pupil 
ability or unmeasured elements of child health, is also correlated with teacher 
absenteeism, endogeneity of teacher absenteeism can emerge.  
To sum up, endogeneity lies at the root of a number of theoretical and 
empirical critiques of the findings of the literature in this field of study. Empirically, 
it is possible to deal with this problem in a number of ways and many of these 
various methods have been adopted and experimented with in the literature. These 
approaches can be categorised as those based on panel data, randomised 
experiments, exogenous inputs and instrumental variable estimation (IV), where IV 
methods can be further classified as those using instruments based on some ‘natural 
experiment’7 and those which appeal to empirical significance in the data set. 
 
5The averages are taken across the 65 sample schools. 
6Although Lahore is primarily a metropolitan district, the rural areas are still agricultural. In fact, 
46.5 percent of the children in the sample mentioned parents who were self-employed and, although our 
data does not allow us to make this distinction, in the field we found that self-employment was almost 
always among the following categories: father was a farmer, had his own shop or retail business, or for 
children from wealthier families, father had a more profitable and wide-spread business. 
7Angrist and Lavy (2001). 
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Ideally, one would want to identify school-reforms or laws which induce 
exogenous variation in school resources as in the study above. In reality, such 
exogenous variation is difficult to locate and data limitations prevail. An alternative 
route is to seek ‘instruments’ in the form of exclusion restrictions—in our case, 
variables that help explain teacher pay and student absenteeism but do not directly 
enter as explanatory variables in Equation (1). Kingdon and Teal (2002) use this 
method to find instruments which are well correlated with achievement and teacher 
pay to deal with the endogeniety of both these variables in their analysis of 
performance related pay and pupil achievement in India. In the private school sector, 
for example, they instrument teacher pay with permanence of status and gender on 
the empirical belief that in the private sector these variables directly enter the teacher 
pay equation but only influence pupil achievement indirectly through their effect on 
teacher pay. Instrumental variable estimation, therefore, relies on finding credible 
instruments for the endogenous variables.  In this paper, lack of convincing variables 
restricts us to reporting OLS parameter estimates alone but we recognise the possible 
biases in our parameter estimates.8  
 
2.1.2  Sample Selection 
Sample selection bias is another potentially important problem in estimating 
education production functions. When the sample used in a statistical analysis in not 
randomly drawn from the population, selection bias may arise.9  In such a situation, 
OLS estimation will lead to misleading inferences. In the discussion which follows, 
we provide an introduction of the primary issue followed by an intuitive and 
theoretical analysis of how sample selectivity may lead to biased estimates and how 
solutions may be found.  
As an example, consider the case where we have data only on a sample of 
private school pupils (or equivalently, only on government school pupils). If we are 
interested in estimating an achievement production function on this sample of private 
school pupils, and if they are also more likely to be more motivated and have higher 
achievement, our sample will be endogenously selected and failure to account for 
 
8We attempted to address possible endogeneity of student teacher-ratio, teacher pay, student 
absenteeism and teacher absenteeism by attempting to seek valid instruments for the endogenous 
variables. However, given the constraints of our data set—in particular the fact that different endogenous 
variables are at different levels of aggregation, such as the individual, the teacher and the school—it is not 
possible to address the endogeneity of all the aforementioned variables. At this point, it is pertinent to 
point out that our measure of pupil’s innate ability, as measured by the score on Raven’s Standard 
Progressive Matrices test, has also been criticised for being possibly endogenous on the claim that this 
score is not independent of the child’s home and school environment. In the absence of any control for 
ability this score provides a measure, albeit imperfect, and potentially endogenous. 
9See Lee (1983); Maddala (1983); Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980); Willis, et al. (1979); Kingdon 
(1996); Greene (2000); Newey, et al. (1990) and Heckman (1990) for literature on sample selection and 
applications to education, migration and private/public school choice.  
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that would lead to biased parameter estimates. If pupil motivation is an unobserved 
variable captured in the error term, and if more motivated pupils are not only likely 
to choose private schools (so that this variable is in the school choice error term) but 
also greater motivation leads to higher achievement (motivation lurks in the error 
term of the achievement equation), we can see it is correlated error terms which 
explain sample selectivity. 
Let us consider now why endogenously selected samples lead to biased 
parameter estimates in an OLS regression. Suppose we have data only on a sample of 
private school pupils and we are interested in analysing the importance of parental 
wealth in determining pupil achievement in private schools. To do so, we fit the 
following equation on the sample of private school pupils: 
Ai = β Xi + ui  … … … … … … (2) 
where Ai is the achievement score of student i, Xi is a vector of the ith student’s 
parental characteristics, β is a vector of parameters and ui is the disturbance term 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ u2.  
Now, given the institutional educational set-up in Pakistan, we know that 
there are two types of schools to which parents can send their children—private and 
government. We can model parental choice of school type as a binary choice 
variable as follows. Suppose now that Z* is a continuous and unobserved latent 
variable which determines parental choice of school type. We can represent Z* as:  
Zi* = γ Wi + εi … … … … … … (3) 
where Wi is a vector of variables influencing type of school parents send their 
children to, γ  is a vector of parameters and εi is the normally distributed error term 
with mean 0 and variance σε2.  Since Z* is assumed unobserved/latent, we can define 
it as: 
Zi = 1 if Zi* > 0  
Zi = 0 if Zi*  0  
where 1 represents private and 0 represents government schools, respectively. Since 
we are interested in estimating Equation (2) on private school pupils only, the 
selection rule of Zi* > 0 suggests that (3) becomes: 
Zi* = γ Wi + εi  > 0   
i.e. εi >– γ Wi  
If we are to take the conditional expectation of (2) given the sample selection 
rule it becomes: 
E (Ai ׀         εi > – γ  Wi) = β  Xi + E (ui ׀            εi >– γ  Wi)  … (4) 
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If there is any correlation between unobserved factors determining 
achievement (captured in ui) and unobservables determining school choice (in ׀   εi), 
then the conditional expectation E (ui ׀         εi > – γ  Wi) would be non zero. Since 
one of the fundamental conditions of OLS would be violated, we can expect the 
parameter estimates of (1) estimated using simple OLS to be biased. It is also fairly 
easy to show that if the corr (ui, ׀   εi)   0 then E (ui ׀         εi > – γ  Wi)    0 but we will 
not do so here due to space constraints.  
Intuitively, suppose that parental wealth is an important determinant of school 
choice (Wi) and pupil achievement (Xi). Also suppose that child motivation is an 
unobservable determining school-choice (captured in ׀     εi) and pupil achievement 
(captured in ui) conditional on school chosen. This suggests that at given levels of 
parental wealth, more motivated children are more likely to be in private schools and 
also likely to be high achievers—corr (ui, ׀        εi) > 0, the error terms are positively 
correlated. 
First, consider the case when a child’s parents wealth suggests that the child is 
equally likely to be in a private or a government school (in other words that γ  Wi = 
0). For this child, therefore, we will observe her in the private school sample if she is 
highly motivated i.e. if ׀      εi > 0 and in the government school if she lacks much 
ambition so that ׀    εi < 0. Since we have said that the error terms are positively 
correlated, E (ui ׀         εi > – γ  Wi) > 0.  
Secondly, consider the case where a child’s observed parental wealth suggests 
that she is highly likely to attend private school i.e. γ  Wi > 0. In this case, this child’s 
ability or motivation is irrelevant in determining school choice and an observable 
(parental wealth) will capture the whole effect and we can argue that E (ui ׀      εi )   0. 
If we are to average over all children in the private school sample, E (ui ׀       εi > – γ 
Wi)    0, is effectively an omitted variable and it is correlated with the included Xi. It 
is because of these problems that OLS estimation will yield biased parameter 
estimates. It is also pertinent to point out that there will be a negative correlation 
between observed parental wealth and the omitted variable. This stems from our 
observation that when parental wealth is low, E (ui    εi > – γ Wi) > 0 but when 
parental wealth is high and the child is assumed to almost certainly to go to private 
school, E (ui        εi > – γ  Wi)   0. This observation reveals to us a possible downward 
bias in the OLS parameter estimates.10  
Heckman (1979) in his seminal paper suggested a method of overcoming the 
bias associated with sample selectivity. Recognising sample selectivity essentially as 
a bias due to the misspecification of the conditional mean of Ai because E (ui ׀       εi 
> – γ  Wi)   0, Heckman suggested a two-step procedure which involves the inclusion 
of a correction term. To employ his approach, one has to adopt the assumption that ui 
and  ׀   εi are independently and identically distributed N (0, Σ) where: 
 
10Draws heavily from Kingdon (1994),  Thesis.  
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and where (ui, εi) are independent of Wi. Given this and the formula for the 
conditional expectation of a truncated random variable, note: 
E (ui ׀        εi > – γ  Wi) = (σ ε u  / σ u2 ) {φ(γ  Wi) / Ф(γ  Wi)}   
where φ(.) and Ф(.) are the probability density and cumulative distribution functions 
of the standard normal distribution. The term {φ(γ Wi) / Ф(γ Wi)} is known as the 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) commonly denoted as λi, and is a monotone decreasing 
function of the probability that an observation is selected into the given sample, in 
this case of private school pupils. However, to estimate λi we need the parameters γ 
and σε. This is where the ‘two-step’ comes into the picture. Heckman suggested 
calculating λi by estimating a probit for the selection equation in the first stage. 
Using the computed IMR, we can plug it into Equation (2) as an additional regressor 
which effectively becomes: 
Ai = β Xi + c λi + ui  … … … … … … (5) 
where c = σ u ρ. 
Estimating (5) using OLS in step two yields consistent estimates of β and c. 
The t-test of c is a test of sample selectivity—a significant t-statistic suggests sample 
selection is indeed taking place while an insignificant t-statistic suggests otherwise. 
In reality the two-step method is fairly easy to implement but a common concern is 
that the inclusion of the IMR introduces a particular form of heteroskedasticty and 
the second step standard errors need to be adjusted to account for the first step 
estimation. However, most econometric packages including STATA automatically 
adjust the standard errors.  
The main issue in the two-step method is that of identification. Although the 
non-linearity of the probit function can identify the parameters of interest, the Wi 
vector in many instances needs to contain additional variables as identifying 
restrictions. In our example, we need at least one variable that directly affects choice 
of school type but does not directly explain pupil achievement (is not in Xi). In 
reality there are very few candidates that meet this requirement. Often economists 
have to rely on the empirical significance of a variable in the probit selection 
equation (and lack of significance in the equation of interest) as an identifying 
restriction. This technique is very open to econometric criticism although it may be 
the only alternative to OLS given data constraints. Once again, lack of suitable 
exclusion restrictions restricts us in this paper to analysing a sample of government 
and private school pupils which is possibly endogenously selected which may yield 
biased parameter estimates. 
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3.  DATA 
The data for this study comes from a purpose-built school-based survey 
conducted by the author in Lahore district in Punjab province, Pakistan in 2002-
2003. Using stratified random sampling on 65 schools (25 government and 40 
private) in urban and rural Lahore, data was collected on 1887 pupils in grade 8th.  
The survey collected data on pupils in any one section/class of grade 8 in the 
sample schools. The exception to this was the case where the private school sampled 
was effectively ‘mixed’ in name but not co-educational in the normal sense of the 
word. We found three possibilities. Either private schools were purely co-educational 
– the pupils of both genders interacted with each other, had the same facilities, and 
sat in mixed classes. This case was fairly normal and was easiest to deal with. The 
other possibility was where the school was constructed or deliberately made to 
operate in two-separate wings which were independent of each other, financially, and 
in terms of facilities available. This meant that any ‘wing’ could be randomly 
selected (boys wing or girls wing) and dealt as a ‘boys only school’ or a ‘girls only 
school’ respectively. The complicated scenario arose when the school visited was 
‘mixed’ in the sense that boys and girls were both housed in the same building of the 
school, but were made to sit in gender-specific sections.  Often, the teachers and 
even the class room facilities facing pupils of different genders in the same building 
were different. In this complicated scenario, the author randomly sampled one 
section/class each of both genders from grade 8 in that school. To ensure the right 
teachers were matched with the right pupils, and to take into account possible 
differences in teaching and even facilities for the pupils in the same building, the 
schools were entered as two separate schools.  
Each pupil filled out a questionnaire containing questions on personal 
characteristics (age, motivation11, gender etc.), parental and family background 
(parental education and occupation, family structure and size, wealth and income 
etc.), schooling (books prescribed in school, length of the school week, family 
expenditure on schooling in the past year, hours of home tuition taken etc.) and 
opinions on various issues such as how important did they think schooling was for 
girls as compared to boys.  
In addition, each child took the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test 
and tests of numeracy and literacy. The Raven’s Progressive Matrices test has been 
used extensively in studies around the world in an attempt to control for the ever-
elusive ‘ability’ of a child. The test consists of 60 items arranged in five sets (A, B, 
C, D, and E) of 12 items each. Each item contains a figure with a missing piece. 
 
11In most studies, motivation or child’s educational aspirations are not controlled for. In our 
purpose designed study, special care was taken to obtain a measure, albeit not a perfect one, to capture 
child motivation. We asked the child the question: ‘What is the highest level of education you wish to 
attain?’ with all possible educational levels (such as Middle school or upto 8th grade, Matric or grade 10 
etc.) as answer choices. 
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Below the figure are either six or eight alternative pieces to complete the figure, only 
one of which is correct. Each set involves a different principle or “theme” for 
obtaining the missing piece, and within a set and across the sets, the items are 
roughly arranged in increasing order of difficulty. This test was designed to measure 
a person’s ability to reason by analogy independent of language and formal 
schooling. Although there is some controversy about how independent this 
instrument really is of formal schooling, the raw score yields an estimate of ability 
which is arguably better than not having any estimate at all.  
The literacy and numeracy tests were developed by the Educational Testing 
Service (ETS) for use by Knight and Sabot in their study in Africa [see Boissiere, et 
al. (1985)] and have been discussed extensively in Knight and Sabot (1990). Since 
then, these tests have been used successfully in studies of achievement, labour 
markets and schooling in various studies around the world [see Behrman and Lavy 
(1994) and Kingdon (1996)]. We adapted these tests to the Pakistani context, 
reduced the number of questions to test the pupils within a given time frame, and 
translated the tests into Urdu to administer them to children in the national language 
when the school was Urdu-medium.  
Additionally, each child was weighed and their height and arm circumference 
measured to obtain anthropometric variables. The survey also collected information 
on a total of 339 teachers who taught the pupils in the section of grade 8 that was 
sampled in each school and collected data on school resources and expenditures by 
interviewing head teachers of the schools. Finally, mostly for consistency checks and 
for additional information, each child was sent home with a ‘parents questionnaire’ 
which was filled out by the parent (or the child asking the parent questions if parent 
was illiterate) and returned to school authorities the next day. Information on 1770 
parent questionnaires was collected and collated.  
 
4.  METHOD 
We are interested in investigating the factors that explain variations in student 
achievement. Different approaches exist in the literature modelling student 
achievement: (i) change in achievement regressed on change in inputs, (ii) 
experimental data, (iii) IV methods. We do not have panel data nor do we have data 
generated through a randomised experiment for Pakistan. The only approach 
available to us, therefore, is the OLS method supplemented with IV estimation to 
control for endogeneity bias and the Heckman two-step to control for the 
endogenous sample selection of students into private and government schools. In this 
paper we present estimates from the simple OLS models and relegate IV and sample 
selectivity corrected results to future work.  
We will first fit OLS functions of pupil achievement. This will be a pooled 
model i.e. fitted on students in both types of schools—government and private. 
However, pooling across school-types imposes the constraint that, except for the 
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intercept term, the vector of all other coefficients is identical across school-types. 
Therefore, as a second exercise, we report OLS parameter estimates of achievement 
production functions separately for government and private schools. However, as 
mentioned in detail above, estimating separate production functions for private and 
public schools involves the problem that the sub-samples of private and government 
school students may not be random draws from the student population but, rather, 
may be endogenously self selected. To avoid inconsistent OLS estimates, we should 
control for sample selectivity bias in the private and public school achievement 
functions using the Heckman two-step method. Inability to find credible exclusion 
restrictions limits us to reporting the results of the simple OLS and we recognise the 
parameter estimates are likely to be biased. Future work will address the issues of 
endogeneity and sample selectivity in some detail.  
 
5.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Table 1 provides the definitions, means and standard deviations of all the 
variables included in the parsimonious models and future regressions. The 
descriptive statistics are presented by school-type to provide a better picture of the 
stark differences among the achievement, family background and school 
characteristics of children belonging to government and private schools. 
 
5.1.  The Pooled Model of Pupil Achievement 
Achievement production functions are employed to fit two different 
pooled models—OLS with and without the private school dummy (PRIVATE). 
The independent variables or inputs into the educational production function fall 
into the following categories: characteristics of the pupils, their family 
background and household structure and characteristics of their teachers, schools 
and peer groups.  
We are particularly interested in analysing how important institutional 
variables are, as compared to family background variables, in determining pupil 
achievement. Also, our more ‘micro’ concern is to analyse the impact of teacher pay 
and student absenteeism on student’s achievement levels. Since our unique data set 
and sample size allow us to experiment with a number of regressors, we adopt 
Hendry’s general to specific approach, including a number of variables in the initial 
regressions, and paring down the model to a more parsimonious one.  
Our dependent variable of interest is the achievement score of the pupil in 
tests of numeracy and literacy respectively. These tests were composed of 25 
questions each; therefore, the highest possible score in ACHIEVE (sum of 
READING and MATH tests) is 50 while that in MATH and READING is 25 each. 
The highest attainable score in RAVEN is 60 but the maximum score obtained by 
our  sample  is  54.  The  distributions  of  the  test  scores  are  not  truncated, exhibit 
 Table 1 
Definitions, Means, Standard Deviations, and Minimum and Maximum Values of Variables 
Total Government Private 
Variable Description Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Pupil Characteristics        
ACHIEVE Student’s total achievement score, i.e. sum of 
READING and MATH 23.29 7.21 20.79 5.76 26.59 7.58 
READING Student’s score on reading (literacy) test 14.38 4.07 13.30 3.61 15.80 4.21 
MATH Student’s score on math (numeracy) test 8.91 4.21 7.48 3.31 10.79 4.51 
RAVEN          
 
Student’s score on the ability test (Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices Test) 28.77 10.49 25.79 9.74 32.69 10.15 
FEMALE12 Student’s gender; female = 1, male =0 0.53 0.49 0.53 0.49 0.54 0.49 
EDU_WISH Child’s educational aspirations; index from 1-6, for e.g. 
1= up to class 8th, 2 = up to Matric (grade 10) etc. 4.76 1.37 4.46 1.39 5.15 1.25 
AGE_YRS Age of child, in years 13.63 1.13 13.71 1.26 13.52 0.94 
BMI Body Mass Index computed as: child weight (kg) / 
(height of child in meters)2 17.32 3.46 16.99 3.16 17.76 3.79 
BMI2 Square of the BMI 312.10 141.93 298.72 125.49 329.72 159.43 
TIRED Index of how often child feels tired in class; 1= very 
rarely, 2= sometimes, 3 = quite often and 4 = most of 
the times 1.46 0.69 1.43 0.66 1.49 0.73 
SABSENT13 Number of days pupil absent from school in September 1.87 2.66 1.89 2.04 1.65 2.14 
HTU_TAKEN Hours of home tuition taken by student in January – 
August, 2002. 264.44 294.64 282.95 291.09 240.14 297.67 
HOME_HELP Hours of home help/week provided by student in 
various tasks 8.26 9.49 10.46 10.86 5.32 6.16 
Continued— 
 
12For 0/1 variables mean represents the proportion of ones in the sample. 
13This variable was highly skewed with a very large proportion of values (40 percent) taking the value 0. Only 19 students were outliers (being absent for 
more than 10 days). This variable was censored at 10 so as to reduce the skewness of the distribution and the effect of outliers.   
 
Table 1—(Continued) 
Family Background        
FEDYRS Father’s education in years 9.77 4.73 8.68 4.66 11.19 4.44 
FED2 Square of father’s education (yrs) 117.73 80.67 97.14 72.99 144.83 82.29 
MEDYRS Mother’s education in years 7.07 5.08 5.79 4.82 8.76 4.92 
MED2 Square of mother’s education (yrs) 76.19 71.47 56.90 61.59 101.76 75.56 
NUMBRO Total number of brothers child has (younger and older) 1.98 1.29 2.16 1.30 1.74 1.23 
NUMSIS Total number of sisters (younger and older) 1.94 1.42 2.08 1.48 1.76 1.32 
BOOKS Quantity of books at home 162.96 300.49 116.73 211.59 223.73 379.16 
FREEHELP 
 
Hours/week mother or father or other siblings help 
pupil with school work 8.39 10.66 10.14 11.79 6.19 8.55 
WEALTH1_2 Wealth index squared 42641.44 43155.47 30860.54 35800.14 58170.80 46966.02 
Teacher Characteristics        
AVG_TEDU Average of teachers’ education in years 14.46 0.92 14.43 0.78 14.49 1.07 
LNAVG_TPAY Average staff salaries in rupees per month 5691.41 2357.82 8.85 0.17 7.98 0.71 
AVG_TRAI Average teacher training in years 1.01 0.66 1.40 0.55 0.50 0.40 
AVG_TENU Average years teachers have been in given school 7.10 4.44 8.88 4.00 4.77 3.87 
AVG_TEXP Average years of experience teacher has 12.15 5.97 15.83 4.07 7.30 4.39 
AVGT_ABS14 Average days teacher was absent from school in past 
year 19.21 19.04 21.20 9.40 9.05 4.99 
MT_EDU Math teachers years of education 14.65 1.15 14.47 1.08 14.89 1.19 
LN_MTPAY Salary of the Math teacher teaching grade 8th 6408.39 3582.77 8.93 0.33 8.06 0.70 
MT_TRAIN Training of Mathematics teachers 0.71 0.93 0.92 1.06 0.43 0.64 
MT_TENU Years Math teacher has been in given school 3.95 4.29 4.39 4.16 3.36 4.39 
Continued— 
 
14This variable was highly skewed with a very small proportion of teachers in government schools being absent for up to 115 days in a year. In 
government schools, this variable was truncated at 50. 
Table 1—(Continued) 
MT_EXP Total years of experience Math teacher has 8.47 8.09 10.53 8.16 5.75 7.15 
MTABSENT Number of days Math teacher was absent from school 
in past year 13.74 18.39 16.02 11.45 6.65 6.56 
School Characteristics        
URBAN School is in urban (1) or rural (0) area 0.82 0.39 0.79 0.40 0.84 0.37 
MATHWEEK Minutes of math instruction per week 228.49 69.85 202.67 44.73 265.08 81.73 
LENGTH_STUDY Length of school week in minutes/week minus the 
minutes/week spent in non-study activities including 
lunch breaks. 1661.98 228.63 1613.94 222.264 1725.29 221.51 
STR15 Student teacher ratio (number of students in school/ 
total number of teachers in school). 28.42 12.58 34.72 12.51 20.11 6.23 
RESOURCE16 Index of physical facilities and teaching material in 
school divided by 1000 for estimation. 1.99 2.46 1.89 2.25 2.13 2.71 
PRIVATE Type of school? Private =1, Government =0 0.43 0.49 – – – – 
Peer Group Variables        
MEAN_RAVEN Average raven score of pupils in 8th grade 28.77 5.75 25.79 3.97 32.69 5.36 
15We would have wanted to calculate the STR as total enrolment in 8th grade divided by the total number of teachers who teach 8th grade but we do not 
have information on the total number of teachers solely teaching all classes in 8th grade.  
16RESOURCE is computed by assigning the following values to the facilities available in school: 1 each to slide, film and overhead projectors, VCRs and 
tape recorders, 2 each to library and science labs, 5 to each playground, canteen, computer lab, sports equipment and computers for pupil use, 10 to each water 
cooler, black boards, fans, electricity and 10 to all desks, regardless of number of desks. This index was computed in such a way to try to capture the facilities 
most likely used and available to 8th graders. The quantity of desks was not multiplied by 10 because the larger the school, the larger would be the number of 
desks. Although the same could be said for black boards and fans, it was felt that they were still possibly capturing availability to 8th graders, if there was not a 
given class room in which all 8th subject classes were held, etc.  
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substantial variance and appear to be normally distributed, which suggests that the 
tests are appropriate measures of achievement for the sampled population. 
The results of the pooled achievement model are presented in Table 2.  The R2 
in both specifications reveals that about half the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained.  A  majority  of  the  significant  variables  in the two regressions have the  
 
Table 2 
Achievement Production Functions on Pooled Data 
OLS (1) OLS (2) 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
CONSTANT 20.533 2.58*** 7.063 0.86 
FEMALE –0.991 –1.87* –1.001 –1.93* 
AGE_YRS –0.306 –2.14** –0.311 –2.21** 
RAVEN 0.253 13.95*** 0.252 13.88*** 
EDU_WISH 0.619 5.44*** 0.567 5.20*** 
BMI 0.022 0.75 0.024 0.81 
HOME_HELP –0.006 –0.39 0.003 0.17 
HTU_TAKEN –0.001 –1.92* –0.001 –2.04** 
TIRED –0.648 –3.23*** –0.674 –3.36*** 
SABSENT –0.186 –2.68*** –0.193 –2.86*** 
FEDYRS –0.106 –1.06 –0.101 –1.01 
FED2 0.007 1.05 0.007 0.95 
MEDYRS –0.153 –1.75* –0.108 –1.20 
MED2 0.014 2.35** 0.011 1.87* 
FREEHELP –0.025 –1.86* –0.018 –1.45 
BOOKS 0.001 3.47*** 0.001 3.30*** 
WEALTH1 –0.002 –0.82 –0.002 –1.00 
LNFINCOME –0.059 –0.29 –0.039 –0.19 
NUMBRO –0.098 –0.87 –0.067 –0.61 
NUMSIS –0.261 –2.78*** –0.248 –2.53** 
AVG_TEDU 0.069 0.18 –0.089 –0.28 
LN_AVGTPAY –0.923 –1.38 0.767 1.88* 
AVG_TRAI 0.992 0.89 1.210 1.22 
AVG_EXP 0.016 0.23 0.093 1.42 
AVGT_ABS 0.008 0.13 0.021 0.34 
URBAN 0.335 0.41 –0.214 –0.29 
STR –0.145 –1.98** –0.183 –1.85* 
LENGTH_STUDY –0.002 –0.81 –0.001 –0.53 
RESOURCE 0.276 –0.81 0.203 1.53 
MEAN_RAVEN 0.305 3.15*** 0.174 1.43 
PRIVATE – – 4.692 2.88*** 
R2 0.490 0.501 
N 1757 1757 
Mean of Dependent Variable 23.29 23.29 
1. The dependent variable is ‘ACHIEVE’. 
2. Asterisks denote significance level:  *** = 1percent, ** = 5 percent,  * = 10 percent.  
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expected signs—older children achieve less, possibly reflecting class repetition; 
tiredness decreases achievement as does student absenteeism, and so on. Mother’s 
education has a positive effect on pupil achievement only if the mother has achieved 
at least five years of education. It is pertinent to point out the sign and significance of 
FEMALE in OLS(1) and OLS(2)—female students appear to achieve significantly 
less than their male counterparts in both specifications of the education production 
function. 
The coefficient on PRIVATE suggests that, ceteris paribus pupils in 
PRIVATE schools achieve on average 4.69 points more as compared to 
government school students. It is apparent that the inclusion of PRIVATE has 
little effect on most of the coefficients that were previously significant in column 
1. However, there are some changes in teacher characteristics. The sensitivity of 
some teacher variables with school type is understandable given the correlation 
between many teacher variables and the type of school they belong to. For 
example, we expect a negative correlation between LN_AVGTPAY and 
PRIVATE—teachers in private schools are paid significantly less than those in 
government schools. In column 1 we expect a downward bias in the coefficient 
on LN_AVGTPAY. The true effect of LN_AVGTPAY should be larger and 
more significant in column 2 which is what we observe.  As mentioned before, 
however, the pooled model imposes constraints which can be overcome by 
estimating separate achievement production functions on the two sub-samples 
and we turn to these in the next sub-section.  
 
5.2.  Achievement Production Functions by School Type 
In this section, we fit three separate production functions for pupil 
achievement, reading and mathematics scores. By doing so, we are able to analyse 
how pupils across private and public schools differ in terms of skills in the different 
subjects. In addition, when fitting production functions for Maths, we introduce 
characteristics of the Mathematics teacher/s and the amount of Maths instruction 
received by the pupils in a given week. This is based on the notion that although 
pupils’ general achievement and reading skills are likely to be affected by interaction 
with teachers in all subject areas such as Science, English and Social Studies etc., 
Mathematics skills are likely to be highly dependent on the quality and competence 
of the Mathematics teacher.  
Tables 3, 4 and 5 report the results of these specifications by school-type. 
Note that the R2 of the government sub-samples in the Achievement, Reading and 
Maths production functions is much less than in the private sample. Firstly, we have 
a smaller sample of 25 government schools as compared to a larger sample of 40 
private schools. Secondly, the variation in the dependent variables ‘ACHIEVE’, 
‘READ’ and ‘MATHS’ in the government sample is much less than in the private 
sample (Table 1). 
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Table 3 
 Achievement (OLS), Government and Private Schools 
OLS (1) OLS (2) 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant –15.103 –0.36 22.074 2.91*** 
FEMALE –5.818 –3.78*** –0.781 –1.16 
AGE_YRS –0.369 –2.57** –0.459 –1.95* 
RAVEN 0.219 9.81*** 0.289 10.55*** 
EDU_WISH 0.627 5.42*** 0.757 3.82*** 
BMI 0.003 0.07 0.034 1.01 
HOME_HELP –0.006 –0.39 0.054 1.34 
HTU_TAKEN –0.002 –3.00*** –0.001 –1.10 
TIRED –0.233 –1.11 –0.715 –2.74*** 
SABSENT –0.157 –2.07** –0.149 –1.94* 
FEDYRS –0.295 –2.70*** 0.056 0.37 
FED2 0.024 2.99*** –0.004 –0.44 
FREEHELP –0.028 –2.05** 0.009 0.32 
BOOKS 0.001 1.33 0.001 4.10*** 
WEALTH1 0.001 0.51 –0.002 –0.62 
LNFINCOME –0.326 –1.13 0.453 2.03** 
NUMBRO 0.013 0.12 –0.148 –0.79 
NUMSIS –0.187 –1.40 –0.422 –3.36*** 
AVG_TEDU 0.224 0.41 –1.391 –3.81*** 
LN_AVGTPAY 4.701 0.77 –0.696 –0.66 
AVG_TRAI 1.608 1.19 0.654 0.54 
AVG_EXP 0.004 0.01 0.143 1.49 
AVGT_ABS –0.078 –1.29 –0.024 –0.26 
URBAN –0.134 –0.09 –0.354 –0.34 
STR –0.023 –0.50 –0.051 –0.65 
LENGTH_STUDY –0.002 –1.47 0.002 1.22 
RESOURCE 0.509 2.21** 0.484 2.27** 
MEAN_RAVEN –0.206 –1.61 0.483 5.74*** 
R2 0.318 0.563 
N  976 786 
1. The dependent variables are ‘ACHIEVE’, ‘READ’ and ‘MATHS’, respectively. 
2. Asterisks denote significance level:  *** = 1 percent ** = 5 percent  * = 10 percent. 
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Table 4 
 Reading (OLS), Government and Private Schools 
OLS (1) OLS (2) 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 18.208 0.81 20.768 4.29*** 
FEMALE –0.871 –1.18 0.450 1.28 
AGE_YRS –0.318 –2.96*** –0.545 –3.37*** 
RAVEN 0.109 9.58*** 0.137 9.47*** 
EDU_WISH 0.337 3.88*** 0.519 3.53*** 
BMI –0.010 –0.39 0.025 1.11 
HOME_HELP –0.011 –1.00 0.049 1.92* 
HTU_TAKEN –0.001 –3.10*** –0.0003 -0.85 
TIRED –0.3111 –2.45** –0.570 –3.09*** 
SABSENT –0.063 –1.42 –0.079 –1.25 
FEDYRS –0.197 –2.97*** 0.178 1.79* 
FED2 0.014 2.84*** –0.010 –1.89* 
FREEHELP –0.011 –1.23 –0.006 –0.39 
BOOKS 0.0003    0.64 0.001 2.00** 
WEALTH1 0.001 0.96 –0.0005 –0.28 
LNFINCOME –0.217 –1.19 0.139 0.86 
NUMBRO –0.002 –0.03 –0.099 –0.94 
NUMSIS –0.076 –0.93 –0.226 –2.39** 
AVG_TEDU 0.089 0.29 –0.858 –3.04** 
LN_AVGTPAY 0.134 0.04 –0.636 –1.16 
AVG_TRAI 1.079 1.39 –0.467 –0.50 
AVG_EXP 0.042 0.31 0.131 1.65* 
AVGT_ABS –0.073 –2.27** –0.013 –0.20 
URBAN 0.064 0.08 –0.561 –0.90 
STR –0.016 –0.59 0.010 0.20 
LENGTH_STUDY –0.001 –1.24 0.003 2.12** 
RESOURCE 0.319 2.51** 0.402 2.46** 
MEAN_RAVEN –0.151 –2.09** 0.168 2.86*** 
R2 0.254 0.437 
N  976 788 
1. The dependent variables are ‘ACHIEVE’, ‘READ’ and ‘MATHS’, respectively. 
2. Asterisks denote significance level: *** = 1 percent  ** = 5 percent     * = 10 percent. 
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Table 5 
 Mathematics (OLS), Government and Private Schools 
OLS (1) OLS (2) 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant –6.779 –2.48** 6.025 1.41 
FEMALE –5.990 –14.51*** –1.912 –3.76*** 
AGE_YRS –0.071 –1.06 0.074  
RAVEN 0.111 8.10*** 0.149 9.05*** 
EDU_WISH 0.329 3.83*** 0.243 2.33** 
BMI 0.001 0.02 –0.002 –0.06 
HOME_HELP –0.004 –0.41 0.010 0.45 
HTU_TAKEN –0.001 –2.04** –0.001 –0.91 
TIRED 0.102 0.74 –0.347 –1.67* 
SABSENT –0.108 –2.19** –0.071 –1.83* 
FEDYRS –0.101   –1.38 –0.103 –1.40 
FED2 0.009 2.06** 0.010 1.19 
FREEHELP –0.019 –2.15** 0.032 1.92* 
BOOKS 0.0003 0.88 0.001 2.65*** 
WEALTH1 –0.0001 –0.04 –0.002 –1.01 
LNFINCOME –0.087 –0.47 0.369 2.55** 
NUMBRO 0.001 0.03 –0.102 –0.83 
NUMSIS –0.116 –1.52 –0.224 –2.28** 
MT_EDU 0.451 4.46*** –0.318 –0.96 
LN_MTPAY –0.086 –0.30 –1.401 –2.06** 
MT_TRAIN –0.805 –3.49*** 0.251 0.47 
MT_EXP 0.008 0.44 0.014 0.35 
MT_ABSENT 0.038 5.05*** 0.013 0.40 
URBAN 1.105 4.13*** 0.056 0.10 
STR 0.039 2.86*** –0.067 –1.69* 
LENGTH_STUDY – – – – 
MATHWEEK 0.008 3.50*** 0.001 0.44 
RESOURCE -0.092 -0.80 0.168 1.65* 
MEAN_RAVEN 0.134 1.87* 0.388 5.56** 
R2 0.289 0.517 
N  976 788 
1. The dependent variables are ‘ACHIEVE’, ‘READ’ and ‘MATHS’, respectively. 
2. Asterisks denote significance level: *** = 1 percent ,  ** = 5 percent,  * = 10 percent. 
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5.2.1.  Achievement in Government and Private Schools 
 
Personal and Household Characteristics 
As is apparent from Table 3, in both school-types, RAVEN and 
EDU_WISH are significant determinants of pupil Achievement and have the 
expected signs. Being a FEMALE has a significantly negative effect on 
achievement in government schools only—it is associated with almost 6 less 
points on average in overall achievement given all other variables are constant. 
A possible explanation for this large gender effect could be that unobserved 
attitudes are important determinants of Achievement in Pakistan. For example, 
parents and girls themselves and also teachers may not place that much 
importance on their education as compared to boys who are expected to be the 
earners of the families (the so called ‘investment motive’). Alternatively, class-
room related gender biases and the gender of the siblings of the child may 
interact in a way that exacerbates gender differences [Butcher and Case (1994)]. 
According to this explanation, the gender of the siblings of the child is important 
because it is the child’s ‘reference group’, and the child adopts the traits of 
his/her sibship. If schools, in addition, differ in the quality and type of 
instruction provided to children and if class room instruction favours certain 
traits of children, differences in Achievement between boys and girls may be 
exacerbated further [Kaestner (1997), p. 256].  
Personal characteristics appear significant determinants of Achievement in 
private schools; helping at home has a positive effect on Achievement in private 
schools (albeit insignificant), while tiredness and home-tuition have the expected 
negative effect. Although HOME_HELP is not significant in the government school 
sample, and the magnitude of the effect is small in private schools, the differential 
effect of this variable in the two samples merits some explanation. One explanation 
could be in the extent of help provided by the children in the two school-types. The 
mean hours/week spent by government school children on helping at home is 10.46 
while private school students spend only about half the amount, an average of 5.32 
hr/week. 
Because government school pupils help out so much at home, it eats into their 
study time and may leave them tired and unable to concentrate on homework and in 
class while private school pupils are refreshed by the diversion that helping provides 
in daily routine.  
Whether a child has private home tuition, seems to have a perverse sign—
negatively affecting pupil achievement, but is a significant determinant only in 
government schools. A possible explanation of this could be that poor 
performance in school induces the parents to complement child schooling with 
home-tuition.   
Monazza Aslam 864
Father’s education has a convex relationship with pupil Achievement which is 
captured by the positive coefficient on FED2 in the government school sample.17  
The home educational environment is captured by the number of books at home. The 
effect of BOOKS is positive in both school types and although the magnitude is 
small and significant only for the private sample, it is strikingly similar across the 
two school-types. At closer inspection we find that the proportion of government 
school pupils with more than 100 books at home is 23 percent while it is 27 percent 
in the private sample. Given this small difference, we are not surprised by the similar 
coefficient across government and private schools. 
One of the most interesting results of our analysis is the insignificance of 
the family economic status in the Achievement functions in government and 
private schools. The insignificance of the WEALTH18 index even in quadratics 
comes as a surprise. This is contrary to the results in other studies. Kingdon 
(1996), for neighbouring India, found a family’s financial status as proxied by 
WEALTH, to be a significant determinant of achievement of 8th graders 
[Kingdon (1996), p. 69]. However, it could be argued that since WEALTH is an 
index of assets held, it may not be a determinant of pupil achievement as it fails 
to capture the ‘liquid’ assets which may determine parental ability to provide 
achievement-friendly inputs to the child such as fan and electricity, desks and 
stationary etc., for instance to facilitate home study. In that case father’s income 
should emerge as an important determinant of achievement and we do find that 
father’s income has a significant positive effect on pupil achievement in private 
schools.  
A larger number of sisters in the household decreases Achievement in both 
samples. A priori, we would expect a larger number of siblings in the house to have a 
negative effect on pupil achievement—parents may be able to devote less time to 
each child or additional children may distract a child from his or her studies. The 
signs on NUMBRO and NUMSIS are consistent with this explanation. There is no 
apparent definitive explanation for this effect of the ‘sibship’ on child achievement. 
One would have to analyse achievement differentials by gender to be able to argue 
whether these differences could possibly be caused by factors such as parental 
fertility behaviour or differential treatment in intra-household allocation which 
manifest themselves in differential schooling outcomes. Jensen (2002) proposes 
 
17Insignificance of maternal education even in quadratics is somewhat surprising particularly 
since Alderman, et al. (1996) found mother’s education to be a key determinant of pupil achievement (pp. 
20). However, their study was based on a sample of primary-school children and it is possible that 
maternal education has a significant effect at that level and not at the secondary level. Mother’s education 
is not included in the parsimonious and preferred regression reported in the tables above. 
18In computing the WEALTH index, we experimented with a wide array of weights for different 
owned assets but none of the indices yielded a significant coefficient on WEALTH.  
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‘son-preferring, differential stopping behaviour’ as an explanation for the apparent 
differential educational outcomes among males and females of school-going age 
arguing that if parents have a strong preference for male children, they will continue 
having children until male offspring are born. In this case, if the first child is a 
female, the number of siblings she has is likely to be larger than when the first child 
is a male. In this case, all children will be worse off as larger family sizes result in a 
dilution of household resources across children. Female children will also be 
differentially affected simply because girls will, on average, tend to have larger 
‘sibship’ sizes. According to this explanation, there is no differential treatment within 
households but data finds evidence of differences simply because of across 
household differences. Aslam (2004) uses household survey data from Pakistan and 
finds evidence of significant pro-male biases in the allocation of household 
educational expenditures among Pakistani households. These results are robust to the 
inclusion of household fixed effects, which suggest that there is significant pro-male 
bias in the allocation of household educational expenditures within households (and 
not just across households). In the current setting, a larger number of sisters could be 
associated with reduced educational expenditures to girls which could manifest itself 
in lower achievement particularly of girls and even of boys if child-leaning is 
affected by sibling learning.  
 
Teacher, School, and Peer, Characteristics 
Of the five teacher variables included in the Achievement function, we find 
that only AVG_TEDU is significant (albeit negative) in the private school sample. 
All other variables such as teachers’ training, salary and experience, expected to 
capture some elements of teacher quality, are unimportant in explaining variations in 
pupil Achievement.  
Of the four school variables included in the regressions, only RESOURCE is 
consistently significantly positive in both sub-samples. Acquisition of cognitive skills 
benefits significantly from improved school facilities. This is hardly surprising; not 
only does international evidence support this finding [Fuller (1986); Kingdon (1998)], 
it is not surprising to find that certain facilities such as black boards, fans, electricity 
etc. positively effect pupil Achievement. It should also be recalled that the coefficient 
on STR may suffer from endogeneity bias which will cause the point estimate to be 
biased towards zero. 
Finally, our peer group variable yields some very interesting results. The 
variable included in our analysis (ability mix of the class, MEAN_RAVEN) was 
chosen so as to allow manipulability by policy-makers. We experimented with two 
other variables—average mother’s education of 8th grade pupils and its square. 
Because of the high collinearity between these and mother’s education in the pooled 
sample, these variables were excluded. It also made more sense to retain variables 
that were amenable to policy interventions. 
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The ability mix of students in a class has a significant effect only in the 
private school sub-sample. While the effect is negative in government schools, 
MEAN_RAVEN has a significant and positive effect in private schools: pupils of 
higher abilities are selected into private schools and interaction amongst them 
improves pupil Achievement while the opposite holds in government schools.     
   
5.2.2.  Reading Skills in Government and Private Schools 
The personal and household characteristics that affect Reading scores are the 
same as those that affect overall pupil achievement. The only difference from the 
above analysis is the fact that females do not seem to achieve less than males in 
either government or private schools. This finding is consistent with that in a number 
of studies which reveal significant female disadvantage in Maths skills but no 
disadvantage in Reading skills. We note that father’s education has a significant 
effect on Language/Reading scores in government and private schools. 
Once again, of the five teacher variables included in the Reading 
specifications only teacher education (AVGT_EDU) and the log of average teacher 
pay (LN_AVGTPAY) appear to be significant determinants of Reading skills in 
the private sample. The fact that both are negative is a somewhat anomalous 
finding which appears to have no outright theoretical explanation. As before, 
RESOURCE is a significant positive determinant of reading skills in both sub-
samples while length of the school day spent studying appears to enhance private 
pupil skills positively.  
 
5.2.3.  Mathematics skills in Government and Private Schools 
It is apparent that females are at a very significant disadvantage in acquiring 
Maths skills as compared to males in government and private schools. The gender 
effect in the Maths equation in government schools is almost 70 percent higher than 
in private schools: being female is associated with a reduction in Maths scores by 1.9 
points in private schools as compared to 5.9 points in government schools. This 
suggests, as before, either that there is less gender gap in the amount of attention paid 
by teachers to girl or boy students in private schools or that more motivated girls 
attend private schools.  
We also note that help provided by parents or other siblings (FREEHELP) has 
a significant and positive effect on Maths scores in the private sub-sample while the 
effect is significantly negative in the government schools. The average hours/week 
of such help in school-work differs significantly by school-type—government school 
pupils get roughly 10 hours of help in a week as compared to 6 hours/week for 
private school pupils. Why FREEHELP does not have a similar effect in the 
government sample can possibly be explained by the quality of help received; both 
parents in the private schools are more educated and come from better social 
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backgrounds as compared to the government sample. In addition, note that in both 
school types, fathers must have at least primary education (5 years) to significantly 
improve their child’s Maths scores. 
Finally, it is apparent that in government schools, a larger number of teacher 
characteristics affect pupil achievement as compared to both overall Achievement 
and Language skills and compared to private schools. Also, the mix of teacher 
characteristics affecting Maths skills changes substantially. 
In private schools, once again teacher pay emerges as a significant 
determinant of pupil test scores. Increasing teacher pay has a negative effect on 
Maths scores and is only just significant at the 10 percent level. Although 
surprising, this does suggest that some of the common measures of teacher 
quality, namely teacher pay and in most instances even teacher education are in 
fact very poor indicators of teacher quality. This conclusion is corroborated by 
the signs on MT_ABSENT and MT_TRAI in the government sub-sample where 
it appears that higher teacher absenteeism and less training actually improve 
pupil’s Maths score. The only finding consistent with expectation is that Maths 
teachers with more education significantly improve government school pupils 
Maths achievement.  
Finally, increased student-teacher ratio (STR) significantly negatively affects 
Maths achievement in private and positively affects that in government schools. This 
suggests that larger class sizes induce interaction among pupils in government 
schools but have a detrimental effect on private school pupils.  
 
5.2.4.  Effect of Student Absenteeism on Achievement 
Table 6 presents the coefficients on SABSENT from the OLS 
specifications (Tables 3, 4 and 5) in the government and private school samples. 
A priori, we expected the coefficient on SABSENT to be negative—an increase 
in student absenteeism decreases achievement. In OLS we expected a downward 
bias—low achievers were expected to be absent more often and, hence, this 
feedback effect was expected to be captured in the OLS coefficient making it a 
bigger negative.  
How does pupil absenteeism affect pupil achievement in the two school-
types? It is apparent that the OLS coefficients are small and negative in all 
instances—pupil achievement in government and private schools and maths skills 
development in both school-types is negatively affected by absenteeism. However, 
these coefficients are possibly downward biased and one would need to instrument 
SABSENT to arrive at more conclusive results.19 
 
19Future work addresses possible endogeneity of SABSENT. 
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Table 6 
OLS Coefficients on SABSENT 
  SABSENTOLS 
Achievement –0.157** 
Reading –0.063 
Government 
Maths –0.108** 
Achievement –0.149* 
Reading –0.079 
Private 
Maths –0.071* 
 
5.2.5. Are Home Background Factors More Important Than  
School-related Factors? 
As concerns the question: ‘Are home background factors more important 
determinants of pupil achievement as compared to school-related factors?’ it can be 
argued that a mix of these variables determine pupil achievement. An exercise to 
disentangle the effects involved regressing pupil achievement only on personal and 
home background factors and then only on school related factors and comparing the 
R2. The OLS results in the government and private sectors differed but the main 
conclusion was that both home and school factors seem to explain variation in pupil 
achievement in Pakistan. For example, in the private sector the R2 of the regression 
on just personal and home background factors was 0.47 while that on just school-
related factors was 0.38. 
The problem of disentangling the effects of personal and home background 
factors and teacher and school variables is that there is a correlation between home 
background and school quality. When we regress pupil achievement on just home 
background factors, the coefficients are upward biased and capture the effects of 
omitted school quality effects. The same is true of a regression of pupil achievement 
on just school and teacher characteristics. Therefore, this analysis has its drawbacks 
and the results can be biased.  
 
5.2.6.  Conclusions 
We have focussed on the factors which determine pupils’ overall 
Achievement, Reading and Math skills across the government and private sectors. In 
particular, we wanted to address the question: ‘how important are teacher pay and 
student absenteeism in determining pupil achievement in Pakistan?’ The answer is, 
in our data set, not very important. We find a large number of personal and home 
background factors determining achievement in both sub-samples. Most common 
measures of teacher quality such as teachers’ education, training and pay seem to be 
very poor indicators of quality. Other school variables, such as pupil-teacher ratio, 
peer group variables and school resources, which are more amenable to policy 
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intervention, seem to be significant determinants of pupil achievement but differ 
across subject areas and by school-type. Initial student absenteeism results suggest 
that absenteeism does appear to have a negative affect on pupils achievement and 
particularly on maths skill development in both school types. However, these 
estimates are possibly biased and one can only draw causal inferences from them. 
Finally, both home background and school-related factors are found important in 
explaining pupil achievement in Pakistan.  
 
6.  COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES 
How do our results compare with studies done internationally and in 
Pakistan? Although Hanushek (1986) was highly pessimistic about the effect of 
school resources on pupil achievement, Fuller (1986) and Harbison and Hanushek 
(1992) in their meta-studies on developing countries conclude that physical school 
facilities seem to be more important in developing countries than they are in 
developed economies. Fuller (1986) in his review of 72 studies, for example, finds 
that class size and teacher pay are not important determinants of pupil achievement 
in developing countries while availability of instructional material and teacher 
training are. Kingdon (1998), for neighbouring India, also found that “Cognitive 
skills acquisition benefits systematically and strongly from schools’ improved 
physical and teaching facilities” (p. 13). However, Kingdon (1998) also found that 
class size does not seem to explain overall achievement and Maths scores for 8th 
grade pupils in India. Our findings corroborate the main conclusion that school 
facilities seem to matter for pupil achievement in Pakistan. But we also conclude that 
class size appears to be an important determinant of Maths scores across school-
types although we do not find any effect of class size in overall achievement and 
reading skills development. Our findings of a negative class size effect are more 
consistent with Case and Deaton (1999) in South Africa, Krueger (1999) for USA, 
Angrist and Lavy (1999) for Israel and Alderman, et al. (1996) for Lahore, 
Pakistan.20  
Alderman, et al. (1995) use the IFPRI data set on two districts in rural 
Pakistan and analyse the determinants of schooling attainment, pupil achievement 
and labour market productivity. For this initial study, the following conclusions of 
Alderman, et al. are of importance: reducing the student-teacher ratio improves 
Maths attainment; increasing teacher quality improves Reading and Maths scores; 
girls appear to be at a disadvantage in numeracy skills but not in Reading and school 
facilities do not seem to explain pupil achievement. Some of these findings are 
consistent with our results. Behrman, et al. (1997) in rural Pakistan also using the 
IFPRI data set find certain teacher characteristics (such as teacher experience and 
better teacher degree performance) to have a positive effect on pupil achievement 
 
20These results have to be taken with a pinch of salt as the estimates do not correct for possible 
endogeneity of the class size variable.  
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while other factors such as average teacher pay and schooling and infrastructure and 
materials do not seem to have much effect on output. Once again, some of the results 
are consistent with our findings while others are not.  
In a recent correlational study conducted by the Academy of Educational 
Planning and Management [AEPM (2000)] in collaboration with UNESCO, an 
attempt was made to assess the learning achievement of students in Science, 
Mathematics and Language (Urdu) in grade 5 in government primary schools. 
Overall Maths achievement was found to be much poorer than Reading achievement. 
Boys performed better than girls in Maths while girls seemed better in Reading 
skills. These findings corroborate ours. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have attempted to analyse the following questions: What are 
the determinants of pupil achievement in secondary schools in Pakistan? Are home 
background factors more important than teacher and school-related factors in 
determining pupil achievement? Can teacher pay be used to allure the teachers? And 
how important is student absenteeism in determining pupil achievement?  
Using data collected from Lahore district, we estimate OLS educational 
production functions across school types and across subjects. The study demonstrates 
that a large number of home background, personal and school-related factors are 
significant determinants of pupil Achievement, Maths and Reading skills. These 
factors differ, depending on the subject being taught. It is not directly apparent 
whether home background factors are more important as compared to teacher and 
school related factors in determining pupil achievement because an analysis on just 
one group of variables as a block biases the coefficients. Teacher pay, as well as a 
large number of teacher variables, appear to be poor indicators of teacher quality. 
Our finding that teacher pay is not a significant determinant of pupil achievement in 
our data set is consistent with Behrman, et al.’s (1997) finding in rural Pakistan. 
Student absenteeism appears to be an important determinant of pupil achievement 
and maths scores in both school types.  
Although our study contributes to the sparse literature in Pakistan on the 
economics of education, caution must be exercised in generalising the findings to 
entire Pakistan. As is apparent from the comparative analysis with other studies in 
Pakistan, conditions among provinces and rural and urban locations are too stark to 
disregard. However, this caveat applies to extant studies as well. On the positive 
side, this study is more comprehensive than most as it carries out detailed school-
based analysis of pupil achievement and tries to delve into the ‘black-box’ of what 
explains pupil achievement across the spectrum of existing school-types in 
Pakistan.  
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Fig. 3. 
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